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ANTITRUST-As Adapted to the Adjudicative Process
the Noerr "sham exception" Assumes an Expanded
Application.
Highway common carriers in California are subject to regulation
by the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC)' and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC)2 . The PUC grants certificates of
public convenience and necessity, without which the California com-
mon carriers cannot move their trucks. Thus, it is of utmost importance
to every carrier that there be free access to the PUC.' In the past,
in order to encourage rigorous competition among motor carriers, the
PUC would frequently announce to the trucking industry that certifi-
cates would be liberally granted and their transfer liberally approved.
Although applications for new routes could be contested, there was
little opposition, since only carriers which were directly affected by
potential competition entered protests. Thus, in effect, the PUC grant-
ed certificates as a matter of course.4 To implement this policy, the
ICC followed a practice of registering certificates issued by the PUC
automatically, without further hearing.5 The policy of the PUC and
the ICC accomplished the objective of vigorous competition among
California truckers.
In 1961, faced with greater competition from smaller companies,
California Transport and the other large truckers in California and in
the sister states decided to lessen competition, not by trying to change
PUC and ICC policy, but by deterring the filing of applications by
competitors with these commissions. To achieve their goal, these
large truckers undertook a common scheme. Each of these large
truckers would make a monthly contribution to a joint trust fund es-
tablished by the truckers. The size of the contributions were based
upon each trucking company's gross income. The truckers then in-
formed their competitors that they would use the trust fund to finance
opposition to each rival application pending before the PUC and the
ICC, or thereafter filed with these commissions. Opposition to com-
1. Cal. Pub. Util. Code sec. 1061-64, 1071 (West 1956).
2. 49 U.S.C. sec. 306(a)(1), 307(a), 308 (a) (1964).
3. 57 Calif. L. Rev. 518, 521 (1969).
4. Id. at 521-22.
5. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755, 762
(9th Cir. 1970). The Ninth Circuit's opinion, also, contains an excellent summary of
the facts of this case.
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petitors' application would be opposed with or without probable cause.
This opposition would be pursued through all stages of administra-
tive and judicial review. Only by abandoning pending applications
and limiting or refraining from filing further applications, could the
competitors of the large truckers avoid such opposition.
The scheme of the large truckers to lessen competition succeeded.
Applications to the PUC and ICC by competitors of the large truckers
were defeated, delayed, or restricted, depleting the resources of the
smaller companies so that they were deterred from instituting or pur-
suing applications. Thus, the joint activities of the large truckers ef-
fectively foreclosed their competitors from access to the PUC, the
ICC, and to the courts. In effect, the large trucking companies sup-
planted the PUC as the regulator of trucking in California.
Trucking Unlimited was one of the small competitors of the large
trucking companies. Together with other smaller trucking firms that
were adversely affected by the activities of the larger companies,
Trucking Unlimited brought suit, in 1966 in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint al-
leged that the attempt of the large trucking companies to deny their
competitors access to the PUC was a violation of the federal anti-
trust laws.7 The district court,8 however, relying on Eastern R.R.
President's Conference v. Noorr Motor Freight, Inc.' and United Mine
Workers v. Pennington0 dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding
of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 2
The court found that the dismissal was improper for two reasons.
First, the court concluded that "the Noerr-Pennington defense does
not bar relief when a conspiracy to employ judicial and adjudicative
6. The suit was brought under sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 15, for in-
junctive relief and damages. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act allows any person injured in his
business or property by violation of the antitrust laws to sue for treble damages.
7. Specifically, the complaint alleged violation of sec. 1 and sec. 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 1-2. But the main thrust of the complaint was a con-
spiracy among the large truckers in restraint of trade, sec. 1 of the Sherman Act.
8. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,
298 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
9. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
10. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
11. Taken together, Noerr and Pennington basically hold that attempts to influence
legislation or public officials are immune from the antitrust laws even if such attempts
have an anticompetitive effect. These two decisions will be dealt with at length later
in this comment.
12. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1970).
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processes in a scheme to restrain trade is alleged."13  Second, the court
held that even if the Noerr-Pennington defense applied to adjudicative
processes, the defendants' conduct in this case fell within the Noerr-
Pennington defense "sham exception"' 4 which allows application of
the antitrust laws to defendants' conduct. 15
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, in part, the decision of
the Ninth Circuit.' 6  The majority's opinion, delivered by Justice
Douglas concluded:
(1) that any carrier has the right of access to agencies and
courts, within the limits, of course, of their prescribed procedures,
in order to defeat applications of its competitors for certificates
as highway carriers; and (2) that its purpose to eliminate an
applicant as a competitor by denying him free and meaningful
access to the agencies and courts may be implicit in that op-
position.17
However, the Court further warned:
First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or
pretext for achieving "substantive evils" . . . which the legis-
lature has the power to control. . . . A combination of entre-
preneurs to harass and deter their competitors from having "free
and unlimited access" to the agencies and courts, to defeat that
right by massive, concerted, and purposeful activities of the group
are ways of building up one empire and destroying another ...
If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used
in violation may be lawful.' 8
Finally, the Court declared that the conduct of the large truckers
fell "within the 'sham exception' in the Noerr case, as adapted to the
adjudicatory process."'19
13. Id. at 760.
14. The "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington defense is derived from the Noerr
case. If a campaign ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action is
really an attempt to directly interfere with business relationships of a competitor, the
antitrust laws are applicable. See Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
15. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755, 761 (9th
Cir. 1970).
16. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
The Ninth Circuit based its decision on two grounds: first, that Noerr did not apply
to the adjudicative process, and, second, that even if Noerr did apply, the large
truckers' direct intent was to restrain trade, thus their conduct fell within the Noerr
"sham exception." The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit by applying the
Noerr exemption to the adjudicative process, but upheld that court's application of the
sham exception. Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan concurred with the decision of
the majority, but they saw no need to distinguish the "sham exception" in its applica-
tion to legislative bodies as opposed to adjudicative or administrative bodies. Justice
Powell and Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
17. 404 U.S. at 515.
18. Id.
19. 404 U.S. at 516.
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The above quoted language is significant for it marks a change in
the Noerr-Pennington defense. The fact that the Supreme Court
stated that the allegations in the complaint fell "within the 'sham ex-
ception' of the Noerr case as adapted to the adjudicative process"2
indicates that some change has taken place. But in order to under-
stand this change, a familiarity with the Noerr and Pennington cases
is necessary.
Noerr2' involved a dispute between the trucking industry and the
railroad industry. The dispute arose from the fact that the trucking
industry had taken from the railroads a great part of the extremely
profitable business of hauling heavy freight. The railroads sought
to prevent the trucking industry from making any more gains in this
area. In order to do so, they hired a third party to conduct a publicity
campaign designed to influence the passage of laws unfavorable to
the trucking industry and to present to the public an unfavorable view
of the trucking industry. The publicity campaign used the third party
technique, making it appear that the publicity circulated was the view
of independent citizens. When the Governor of Pennsylvania vetoed
a favorable trucking bill, the truckers charged that it was the rail-
roads' publicity campaign that had led to his action. Subsequently,
the truckers filed an antitrust suit against the railroads seeking dam-
ages and an injunction restraining the railroads from any acts in
furtherance of this conspiracy.22
In deciding Noerr, the Supreme Court considered Parker v.
Brown,23 a decision which held that a restraint of trade created pur-
suant to valid state action, once in effect, is immune from the anti-
trust laws, and extended that decision to Noerr. The court deter-
mined that since it is not an antitrust violation for a government to
validly restrain trade, it should not be an antitrust violation to legiti-
mately attempt to influence the government to impose that restraint
of trade. The rationale of the Court was predicated upon the right
of the people to make their views known to their elected representa-
tives who then had the responsibilty to decide whether such views
should be given the status of laws. The Noerr court then stressed
that the function of the antitrust laws is to regulate economic activity,
not political activity.24
20. Id.
21. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
22. Id. at 130.
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
24. The Noerr Court said:
In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of government
376
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Therefore, the Court held that the railroads' actions were beyond
the scope of antitrust laws.2" As a warning, however, that all at-
tempts to influence governmental action may not be immune to the
antitrust laws, the Court announced the "sham exception." This pro-
nouncement recognized that some attempts to influence governmental
action may be nothing more than a "sham" to hide an actual purpose
of direct interference with a competitors' business relations. Even
though the railroads in Noerr conducted an intensive, perhaps even
malicious, lobbying campaign against the railroads, the Court found
their lobbying activities a genuine attempt to influence legislation and
not a "sham. 26
Four years after the Noerr decision, the Supreme Court decided the
Pennington case. 27  In this case the United Mine Workers, and var-
ious large mine operators had sought to drive smaller coal producers
out of business. As a part of their plan to do this, they attempted
to influence governmental decision. Primarily, they strove to per-
suade the Secretary of Labor to set a higher minimum wage for the
employees of those coal producers who sold to the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Pennington was a small coal producer whom the United
Mine Workers sued for welfare fund payments due under the union's
collective bargaining contract. Pennington then counterclaimed ask-
ing for treble damages, alleging a violation of the antitrust laws by the
larger coal companies and the union in seeking to drive the smaller
producers out of the industry.28
The Supreme Court in Pennington held that the efforts to influence
the Secretary of Labor and the TVA officials were exempt under
Noerr.29 In so holding the Court made no mention of the "sham
exception" of Noerr. The Court stated:
The Sherman Act, it was held [in Noerr], was not intended to
bar concerted action of this kind even though the resulting offi-
cial action damaged other competitors at whom the campaign
act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of
representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives. To hold that the government retains the
power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time,
that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would im-
pute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legis-
lative history of that Act. 365 U.S. at 137.
25. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
145 (1961).
26. 365 U.S. at 144.
27. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
28. Id. at 659.
29. Id. at 670.
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was aimed. Furthermore, the legality of the conduct "was not
at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had
. .. even though the "sole purpose in seeking to influence the
passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy the truckers
as competitors for the long distance freight business,"....
Nothing could be clearer from the Court's opinion [in Noerr]
than that anticompetitive purpose did not illegalize the conduct
there involved.80
The Court then expanded the Noerr doctrine to include attempts
to influence the executive branch of government:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such con-
duct is not illegal, either standing alone or as a part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.3'
The Noerr "sham exception" had warned that where the actual pur-
pose of an attempt to influence the government is to destroy a com-
petitor, that conduct will not be exempt from the antitrust laws.32
Pennington, by failing to mention the Noerr "sham exception", im-
plies that any attempt to influence the government is exempt from the
antitrust laws.13  If such an analysis is valid, Pennington broadens
considerably the scope of the Noerr exemption. 4
How then does the decision of the Supreme Court in Trucking
Unlimited35 affect the Noerr and Pennington decisions? First, while
Noerr and Pennington consider only the legislative and executive
functions of government, Trucking Unlimited applies the Noerr-
Pennington exemption to the adjudicative process.3 6  Since there had
been some differences of opinion as to the applicability of Noerr to
the adjudicative process among the lower courts, 37 Trucking Unlim-
ited definitely establishes that the Noerr exemption applies to the ad-
30. 381 U.S. at 669.
31. Id. at 670.
32. 365 U.S. at 144.
33. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965).
34. See Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Govern-
ment Action, 81 Harvard L. Rev. 847, at 852. The author suggests the reason for this
difference between Noerr and Pennington is that Pennington ignores the general prin-
ciple underlying Noerr: that the Sherman Act should be applied to activity governed
by economic mechanisms, but should permit political decisions to be responsive to the
political processes. Pennington, thus, concentrates solely on political considerations,
ignoring the economic considerations.
35. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
36. Id. at 510-11.
37. For example, a federal district court in the 7th Circuit applied the Noerr ex-
emption to the adjudicative process. See Brackens Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe, 273
F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ill. 1967). Courts in the 8th and 9th Circuits, however, refused to
apply the Noerr exemption to the adjudicatory process. See United States v. Otter
Trail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971) and Trucking Unlimited v. Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
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judicative process. More importantly, however, Trucking Unlimited
reaffirms the "sham exception" which was expounded in Noerr and
omitted in Pennington, for the decision proclaims that although every
one has the right of access to adjudicative processes to defeat his
competitor, implicit in such opposition may be the desire to eliminate
him as a competitor. Such a purpose is illegal for it violates the anti-
trust laws, and any conduct to achieve that end cannot be sanctioned. 8
Not only does Trucking Unlimited reaffirm the Noerr "sham excep-
tion", it also strengthens it by broadening its scope so that certain
activities permitted in the legislative area are forbidden in the adjudi-
cative process. The Court said:
Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not im-
munized when used in the adjudicatory process. . . . One claim,
which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed;
but a pattern of baseless repetitive claims may emerge which
leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judi-
cial processes have been abused . . . . Insofar as administrative or
judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire
immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of "political ex-
pression."' 9
The impact of Trucking Unlimited may well extend to other areas
in which Noerr and Pennington have been cited as authorities. Noerr
has been cited as supporting the first amendment right of assembly."'
Trucking Unlimited affirms the right of association as applied to the
adjudicative process."
Noerr has also been cited42 as strongly supporting the state action
exemption as enunciated in Parker v. Brown.48  Most likely, Truck-
ing Unlimited will not affect the Parker decision which gave an ex-
emption from the antitrust laws to legitimate state action. There is,
however, some language in Trucking Unlimited that might cause some
concern to advocates of the state action exemption. The Supreme
Court in Trucking Unlimited stated in dictum that regarding the anti-
trust laws: "If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the
38. 404 U.S. at 515.
39. Id. at 513.
40. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963), United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 283 (1967) (White and Harlan, J.J., dissenting), and Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 42 (1968) (Harlan, J. concurring).
41. 404 U.S. at 510-11.
42. See Allstate Ins. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
930 (1966), Wiggins Airways v. Mass. Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966), and Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Electric Coop.,
394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 488 (1968).
43. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
379
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means used in violation may be lawful. ' 44  If lower courts take
these words literally, they could undermine the state action exemp-
tion, for if the end is unlawful, (a restraint of trade or monopoly),
it matters not that the means (state action) are legitimate. It re-
mains to be seen if such an interpretation will be given to these
words in Trucking Unlimited."
The proposition for which Noerr and Pennington is most frequent-
ly cited is that attempts to influence the government as policy maker
are exempt from the antitrust laws. The lower court cases decided
after Noerr and before Pennington were generally faithful to Noerr
and its "sham exception." These courts apparently realized that Noerr
had not given blanket protection to all attempts to influence govern-
mental action. 4" When Pennington was decided, however, there arose
differences between lower courts concerning the application of the
sham exception. For example, one court held that the Noerr-Penning-
ton exemption applied even though the direct intent of the party seek-
ing to influence the governmental action was to put his competitor
out of business. 47  Similarly, another court held that an inquiry into
motive behind an attempt to influence the government was foreclosed
by Noerr and Pennington.48 On the other hand, some courts have
deemed it appropriate to inquire as to the motive of the parties at-
tempting to influence the government, and have refused to exempt
from the antitrust laws attempts to influence governmental policy ac-
tion which utilized fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion.4 9 These
courts viewed such attempts not as legitimate efforts to influence polit-
ical policy, but as attempts to drive competitors from business, thus
viewing the "sham exception" as encompassing more than it did in
Noerr.
44. 404 U.S. at 515.
45. There are also a small number of cases which have cited Noerr as authority
for the proposition that if legitimate activities of the market place harm a competitor, no
antitrust violation results. See, e.g., United States v. American National Gas Co.,
206 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Il1. 1962), and Indus. Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical
Corp., 278 F. Supp. 938 (C.D. Cal. 1967). The language of Trucking Unlimited
concerning illegal ends and legitimate means casts doubt upon the validity of that propo-
sition today. In light of Trucking Unlimited the proposition is probably not valid as
regards the adjudicative function of government, and courts may now be reluctant to
apply it to the legislative and executive functions of government.
46. See Union Carbide v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 801 (1963); United States v. Northern California Pharm. Ass'n, 235 F. Supp.
378 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
47. Schenley Indus., Inc. v. N.J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers, 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.
N.J. 1967).
48. Brackens Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe, 273 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ill. 1967).
49. Control Data Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd
430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970), Woods Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), and Sacramento Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971).
380
Case Comments
By reaffirming and strengthening the "sham exception" of Noerr,50
Trucking Unlimited suggests that the Supreme Court views the latter
group of above cases as correct. It is submitted that Trucking Un-
limited puts to rest the notion held by some lower courts that the
Noerr exemption, as expanded by Pennington, applies irrespective of
the motive behind an attempt to influence government policy making.
Although Trucking Unlimited deals with the adjudicative process of
government, its emphasis on the Noerr "sham exception" perhaps indi-
cates that the Supreme Court considers the "sham exception" to be an
integral part of the Noerr exemption and, thus, still very much appli-
cable even in the policy making area.
There remain two areas in which courts have cited Noerr and
Pennington as authority; conspiracy with government officials and in-
fluencing the government as a buyer or seller. The first case involving
conspiracy with a government official in which Noerr was cited was
Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin. 1 In Parmalee the Seventh Circuit
held that no antitrust violation occurred where an ICC (member) had
wrongfully aided a company in securing an exclusive contract to transfer
baggage at a railroad terminal. The Parmalee court applied the "sham
exception" of Noerr with its political activity rationale to this attempt to
influence a public official whose function was more that of a decision
maker rather than that of a policy maker.52 Three years later, the
Ninth Circuit in Harmon v. Valley National Bank53 reached a different
conclusion. In that case, the court held that where the attorney general
was a participant in a scheme to place a financial institution in receiver-
ship, as part of a larger scheme to monopolize financial operations
in an area, an antitrust violation could be found. The court held that
in such a situation the Noerr exemption was inapplicable.54 Both
Parmalee and Harmon were decided before Pennington. After Penning-
ton was decided, two lower court cases considered the Noer exemption
in relation to a conspiracy with governmental officials to restrain com-
merce. In Independent Taxicab Operators Ass'n v. Yellow Cab Co.,55
a district court decision, the court, citing Harmon, stated that Noerr did
not exempt from the antitrust laws conspiracies involving public offi-
cials.56 The next year, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
50. See p. 375 (supra).
51. 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961).
52. Id. at 805.
53. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
54. Id. at 566.
55. 278 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
56. Id. at 985.
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Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co. held that the
defendants' actions in obtaining an exclusive franchise for garbage pick-
up and disposal was not violative of the antitrust laws.57 Involved in
the defendants' actions was an alleged participation by some county
commissioners in a conspiracy to obtain an exclusive franchise. The
court noted that while Harmon held that an attempt to influence an
official, when part of a broader scheme, was a violation of the anti-
trust act, Pennington has subsequently held that joint efforts to in-
fluence public officials were not antitrust violations either standing
alone or as a part of a broader scheme.5" The Sun Valley court, hav-
ing concluded that Harmon had been overruled by Pennington, there-
fore applied the Noerr exemption, as expanded by Pennington, to the
area of governmental participation in a conspiracy.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Trucking Unlimited how-
ever, endangers the viability of the Sun Valley and Parmalee de-
cisions. First, Trucking Unlimited, in enlarging the "sham excep-
tion" to Noerr, retreats from Pennington by stating that an illegal
end may make the means illegal.59 In light of this statement, a court
should be hesitant to hold, as did Pennington, that joint efforts to
influence the government, even though part of a larger scheme to re-
strain trade, do not violate the antitrust laws. Second, Trucking Un-
limited stresses that the Noerr exemption is based on political activity,
and that unethical conduct, though permitted in the political arena, is
not allowable in the adjudicative process. 60 A conspiracy between pri-
vate parties and government officials to restrain trade may go well be-
yond the political arena. Thus, a lower court will now have to decide
whether or not a conspiracy involving governmental officials is con-
cerned with the legislative or adjudicative function of government.
If it involves the adjudicative process, such unethical conduct as gov-
ernment conspiracy will fall within the scope of the "sham exception"
as broadened by Trucking Unlimited, and no immunity will exist.
Parmalee, Harmon, and Sun Valley involved activities of an ICC
member, an attorney general, and a county commissioner; all their
activities concerned adjudicative rather than policy making functions,
since their duties were not to make policy, but to carry out policies
already made. Thus, it is submitted, only the Harmon decision is
consistent with the rationale of Trucking Unlimited.
57. 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969).
58. Id. at 342.
59. See p. 379 (supra).
60. See p. 379 (supra).
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Finally, there are two cases which cite Noerr as authority in the
area of the government as buyer. These two cases reached opposite
conclusions. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp."' held that any
activity engaged in to influence the decisions of public officials on
pipe specifications could not be the basis of a finding of a violation of
the antitrust laws. The court cited Noerr as authority for its posi-
tion.62  In a later decision, George R. Whitten Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc.,6" the First Circuit held that the Noerr exemption from
the antitrust laws did not apply to an effort to influence public offi-
cials to adopt certain specifications for swimming pools. The court's
rationale was that Noerr applied to political activity and that attempts
to influence government officials as to purchases were more in the
economic than the political realm. The court said:
The state legislatures, by enacting statutes requiring public bid-
ding, have decreed that government purchases will be made ac-
cording to strictly economic criteria. Paddock is free to seek
legislative change in this basic policy, but until such change is se-
cured, Paddock's dealings with officials who administer the bid
statutes should be subject to the same limitations as its dealings
with private consumers. Indeed, to hold otherwise might impair
the effectiveness of competitive bidding. 64
In Hecht v. Pro Football,65 which involved the government as
"seller", the D.C. Circuit held that although the D.C. Armory Board
had the right to provide a stadium for athletic events, Congress did
not intend for their activities to be outside the scope of the antitrust
laws. The court found that the lease granted by the board to a pro-
fessional football team violated the antitrust laws because the lease
prohibited all other professional football teams from using the sta-
dium. Stating that the Noerr exemption could not shelter the defend-
ants from the application of the antitrust laws, the court stressed
that Noerr's emphasis was on insuring uninhibited access to govern-
ment policy makers. In the area of the government as seller and
buyer, Hecht viewed a policy maker as one who could make significant
policy determinations and not merely technical decisions.16 Hecht,
thus, agrees with Paddock Pool that the Noerr exemption does not
apply to influencing the government as seller or buyer. An interest-
61. 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Penn. 1966).
62. Id. at 452-53.
63. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
64. Id. at 33.
65. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. Id. at 941.
1972
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ing aspect of Hecht is that the court considered the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Trucking Unlimited and its view that the procurement func-
tion of government was similar to an adjudicative process:
The court in Trucking Unlimited apparently considered that an
adjudicative agency was in a position similar to a governmental
agency charged with procurement, as in Paddock Pool. In
neither case was the governmental agency in a position to make
governmental policy, it was obligated to carry out the policy as
already made, hence the rationale of Noerr-Pennington, guar-
anteeing access of private parties in combinations which would
otherwise be illegal under the antitrust laws to influence such
agency simply did not apply.67
If the Ninth Circuit view in Trucking Unlimited, that the govern-
ment as buyer or seller is exercising an adjudicative function, is im-
plicit in the Supreme Court's opinion, Trucking Unlimited will apply
to the government as buyer or seller. Since Trucking Unlimited
broadens the "sham exception" '68 of Noerr, certain activities condoned
in the legislative process will not be condoned in the area of influ-
encing governmental buying and selling. If, for example, any fraud
is involved in influencing government to buy or sell, no antitrust ex-
emption will be permitted. If the actual purpose of an attempt to in-
fluence governmental buying and selling is to restrain trade, then
Trucking Unlimited makes it clear that such conduct is illegal: "If
the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the means used in viola-
tion may be lawful." 69  Thus, if Trucking Unlimited applies to the
area of governmental buying and selling, then the view expressed in
Paddock Pool and Hecht is compatible.
Trucking Unlimited, in stressing that the adjudicative process must
be treated differently from the legislative process, affirms that the
antitrust laws are an economic rather than a political measure. In up-
holding the "sham exception" and broadening it in the adjudicative
area, the Court has perhaps reversed a trend, started by Pennington,
to disregard all considerations of intents in applications of the Noerr
exemption. Now, perhaps, with lower courts made aware by Truck-
ing Unlimited that certain unethical practices exempted by Noerr in
the legislative area will not be condoned in the adjudicative area, such
practices as government participation in conspiracy and influencing
the government, as buyer, to employ questionable standards will cease.
67. Id. at 942.
68. See p. 379 (supra).
69. 404 U.S. at 515.
384
Vol. 3: 373
Case Comments
Perhaps, the most difficult aspect of Trucking Unlimited for courts to
apply will be the distinction between policy making and adjudicative
processes. This distinction is important, for in the adjudicative area,
the "sham exception" is broader. For example, certain types of gov-
ernmental involvement in a conspiracy to restrain trade might possibly
escape the more narrow "sham exception" of the policy making proc-
cess, but "[M]isrepresentations condoned in the political arena are not
immunized when used in the adjudicatory process. ' 70 Thus, the scope
of the Noerr exemption in future decisions will depend upon how
each particular court answers this question: Is the alleged violation
an attempt to influence a governmental policy making process or an
attempt to influence an adjudicative process?
JOHN PATRICK JOYCE, JR.
70. 404 U.S. 513.
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